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Stringer: Workmen's Compensation

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I.

POST-INJURY EARNINGS

Outlaw v. Johnson Service Co.' affirms the proposition of law
which was set forth in the 1969 term of the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Owens v. Herndon.2 The claimant sustained a compensable
back injury for which he was paid 10 weeks' benefits. Thereafter, he
returned to work making the same or more money than he made prior
to the injury. He was not able to do the more strenuous work, but his
employer was nonetheless satisfied with his performance. The South
Carolina Industrial Commission found a thirty percent permanent,
general, overall bodily disability and awarded him compensation.
Upon appeal to the Richland County Court of Commn Pleas, the
award was set aside. The South Carolina Supreme Court, two justices
dissenting, affirmed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas. The
majority cited Section 72-10 of the South Carolina Code which defines
"disability" as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which
the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any
other employment." '3 The majority relied heavily on the decisions of
Parrotv. Barfield4 and Owens v. Herndon,5 in deciding that disability
was to be measured solely by the employee's capacity to earn the wages
he was receiving at the time of his injury. According to the majority,
medical opinion is not determinative as to whether the claimant has
suffered a disability if there is no diminution in earning capacity.' The
supreme court concluded its opinion by noting that if such claims are
to be compensated the ruling should be changed by the legislature, not
7
by the court.
Justices Bussey and Lewis dissented in this case as they did
previously in Owens v. Herndon.s Justice Bussey felt that since there
was a possibility that the claimant was receiving, not earning, postinjury wages equal to his pre-injury wages, the case should have been
1. 254 S.C. 486, 176 S.E.2d 152 (1970).
2. 252 S.C. 166, 165 S.E.2d 696 (1969).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-10 (1962).
4. 206 S.C. 381, 34 S.E.2d 802 (1945).
5. 252 S.C. 166, 165 S.E.2d 696 (1969).
6. In Walker v. City Motor Car Co., 232 S.C. 392, 102 S.E.2d 373 (1958) the South

Carolina Supreme Court noted that: "Loss of earning capacity alone is the criterion and
medical opinion as to the extent of physical disability can have no probative value against
actual earnings."
7. 254 S.C. 486,490, 176 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1970).
8. The dissenting opinion in Owens is discussed in 21 S.C.L. REv. 677, 680-81

(1969).
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remanded to the Commission for a full determination of this factual
issue. Justice Bussey concluded by noting that if the case be remanded,
it would be in order to expressly hold that the simple receipt of, as
opposed to earning, post-injury wages equal to pre-injury wages is not
a legal bar to a finding of disability. 9
II.

WEIGHT GIVEN

To

MEDICAL TESTIMONY

The central issue in Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co." was
whether the Commission had the power to make a determination as to
the cause of an injury when medical testimony conflicted with the
Commission's finding. The claimant in this case sustained a fracture
of his right elbow on July 28, 1968, in a non-compensable motorcycle
accident. Subsequently,on November 22, 1968, he sustained an injury
to his right shoulder and arm while at work.
According to medical testimony, the second accident could not
have caused the disability in the claimant's arm. There was also medical testimony to the effect that the claimant had suffered no permanent
disability from the first non-compensable accident. In spite of this
testimony, the Hearing Commissioner found that the second accident
aggravated the pre-existing injury to the right elbow, and awarded the
claimant compensation for thirty percent permanent disability. The
Full Commission increased this award and found that the claimant had
suffered forty percent permanent disability in his arm.
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that there are situations where the lay mind may draw reasonable-inferences of causation,
notwithstanding conflicting medical testimony. The main basis for the
award was the personal observation of the injury by the Industrial
Commission, and other circumstantial evidence which pointed to the
fact that the injury was caused by the compensable accident. The supreme court concluded that the injury "was so naturally and directly
connected with the accident that proof of causality does not depend on
expert evidence.""
III.

FINDINGS MUST BE SUPPORTED IN THE OPINION

In Hill v. Jones,'2 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
9. 254 S.C. 486, 492, 176 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1970).
10. 177 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. 1970).
I1. Id. at 8, quoting Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 40 S.E.2d
681 (1946).
12. 178 S.E.2d 142 (S.C. 1970).
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decision of the Common Pleas Court and remanded the case to the
Industrial Commission because the opinion of the Commission did not
give a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other
matters pertinent to the question at issue, as required by Section 723
354 of the 1962 Code of Laws.
The claimant testified that injuries which he sustained to his left
shoulder were the result of a fall from a scaffold. The employer and
its carrier denied liability, contending that the claimant had a physical
seizure of some sort which caused him to fall while he was walking
across the construction site. The hearing commissioner denied the
claim, but the Full Commission reversed this decision and remanded
the case to the hearing commissioner to determine the benefits due the
claimant. Upon appeal to the circuit court, the award was affirmed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that, although there
was conflicting evidence as to the cause of the injury, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding in favor of the claimant. The supreme court then noted that the Industrial Commission is required by
statute to file its award with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings
of law, and other matters pertinent to the question at issue. 4 The main
question at issue below was whether the claimant was injured because
of a fall from a scaffold, or from a seizure which caused him to fall.
The opinion of the Majority Commission contained only brief references to the testimony, and the reason given for the award was simply
that the "basic purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to
include injured workmen within its protection rather than exclude
them."' 5 The supreme court, in remanding the case, noted that the vice
of this opinion was that it gave no indication of the basis for the finding
of compensability, thereby creating a substantial question as to
whether the claimant proved his right to benefits by the preponderance
of the evidence.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-354 (1962).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-354 (1962).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-1 (1962), the pe-'tinent parts of which read:
Compensation laws constitute a form of social legislation and were enacted primarily

for the benefit, protection and welfare of working men and their dependents

. . .

and

the Act should be given a liberal construction in furtherance of the purposes for which
it was designed . . . but should not be converted into a form of insurance. . .or be so
construed as to do violence to a specific requirement of the Act.
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ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

In Floyd v. W. 0. Greene Plumbing &HeatingCo.,"6 the employee
was found dead during working hours at a location where his duties

required him to be. There was no eye witness to the death, nor a definite
medical opinion as to the cause of death. Upon a claim for death
benefits the Industrial Commission held that the death of the employee
was due to an accident which arose out of and in the course of employment and accordingly made an award to the claimants. The South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the award, relying on the principle
that where an employee is found injured or dead at a time and place
where his employment reasonably required him to be, there is a presumption of fact that the injury or death arose out of and in the course
of employment.17
The sole issue involved in Compton v. Town of Iva"s was whether
the death of the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment. The employee, Compton, was one of three policemen employed
by the town of Iva. In August 1967 Compton submitted his resignation,
to become effective on August 15, 1967. On August 12, while off duty,
but still "on call", Compton went with another Iva policeman to
investigate a disturbance at a local cafe. Upon completion of his investigation, Compton got in the patrol car of State Highway Patrolman
L. E. Browder, intending to go back to the cafe to check it periodically.
Browder then received a call to travel to an accident involving a motorcycle. While proceeding towards the site of the accident, the patrol car
was involved in a head-on collision in which Compton was killed.
The case was originally heard before a single commissioner who
made an award to the widow and children of the employee. This award
was subsequently affirmed by both the Full Commission and the Court
of Common Pleas. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming
the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, reasoned that since the
Industrial Commission was the fact finding body, and the evidence was
susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, the finding of the
16. 179 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. 1971).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-401 (1962) provides in part:
"Injury shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of the employment. .. "
See also, Steed v. Mount Pleasant Seafood Co., 236 S.C. 253, 113 S.E.2d 827 (1960);
Jake v. Jones, 240 S.C. 574, 126 S.E.2d 721 (1962).
18. 180 S.E.2d 645 (S.C. 1971).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/16

4

Stringer: Workmen's Compensation
SOUTH

CAROLINA

LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. 23

commission that Compton's death arose out of and in the course of
his employment should not be overruled.
V.

JURISDICTION

The issue presented in Chavis v. Watkins"0 was whether the claimant Chavis was an employee or a subcontractor. The Industrial Commission, reversing its hearing commissioner, concluded that the claimant was an employee. The circuit court affirmed this decision.
Since the issue was jurisdictional, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the Commission's conclusion was subject to review
even though it was supported by competent evidence. Before reviewing
the evidence, the supreme court noted that an independent contractor
is basically one who is not subject to the control of his employer except
as to the result of his own work."0 The supreme court found that the
decisions of the circuit court and of the Industrial Commission were
supported by the preponderance of the evidence. The employer furnished the paint and paid the claimant an hourly wage for his labor.
Most importantly, Chavis was obligated to comply with any instructions given him by his employer Watkins, whenever a job needed to be
changed because of customer dissatisfaction. This element of control
precluded the appellants from proving that Chavis was an independent
contractor and therefore not entitled to compensation.
VII.

CIVIL SUIT

In Boykin v. Prioleau,21 the administratrix of Boykin's estate
commenced this action against the administrator of the estate of a
fellow employee, Richard Dickerson. Boykin, who was sixteen years
old, was killed in an automobile accident while being driven home by
Dickerson, an adult co-employee of Gene's Pig 'n Chick in the City of
Columbia. It was Dickerson's duty to take Boykin and other employees to their respective homes after work. On the night of the accident
Dickerson did not take them home, but instead he took them on an
extensive joy ride during which time some intoxicants were consumed.
Shortly after leaving a restaurant on Farrow Road, Dickerson lost
19. 180 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 1971).
20. Bates v. Legette, 239 S.C. 25, 34-35, 121 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1961).
21. 179 S.E.2d 599 (S.C. 1971).
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control of the car and the accident occurred in which all but one of the
occupants were killed.
The hearing commissioner found Boykin's death to be compensable. Pending appeal to the full commission, the claim was compromised
and settled without admission of liability. This action for wrongful
death was then commenced against the administrator of the estate of
Richard Dickerson.
The court below granted defendants motion for a directed verdict,
ruling that Boykin was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, and that any tort action based upon the negligence of a coemployee was barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act.22
The majority of the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower court, noting first that contributory negligence is
no defense against liability based on reckless misconduct. In regard
to See. 72-401, the majority said that "a fellow employee is not exempt
from common law liability unless at the time of the delict, the employee
. . .was performing work incident to the employer's business under
circumstances which, in the absence of an applicable common law
defense, would have rendered the employer liable at common law, for
'z
the acts of the employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior."
The majority felt that the only reasonable inference was that Dickerson
had embarked upon the pursuit of his own ends. Therefore, he was not
conducting his employer's business within the meaning of the statute,
and was not exempt from common law liability.
The sole dissenter to the majority opinion, Justice Littlejohn,
agreed with the rule that an employee is not exempt from common law
liability unless the employer is liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, but disagreed with the application of the rule to the facts of
this case. Justice Littlejohn felt that since the employer was under a
contractual duty to take Boykin home, he could not delegate this duty
to another and be free from liability. Ordinarily, when an employee
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-401 (1962) provides in part:
An employee, subject with his employer to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State, whose injury arises out of, and in
the course of, his employment cannot maintain an action at common law
against his co-employee, whose negligence caused the injury.
23. 179 S.E.2d 599, 600 (S.C. 1971), quoting Williams v. Bebbington, 247 S.C. 260,
266, 146 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (1966).
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deviates substantially from his assignment, the master is not liable, but
"where the master, by contract or operation of law, is bound to do
certain acts, he cannot excuse himself from liability upon the ground
that he has committed that duty to another, and that he never authorized such person to do the particular act." 4 The dissent concluded that
since the employer could be held for the delicts of the driver under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer and the employee were
both exempt because of the Workmen's Compensation Act and could
not be prosecuted in this civil action.
PATRICK

F. STRINGER

24. Id. at 603, quoting Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S.W. 70
(1893).
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